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Available online 21 February 2017AbstractThis paper summarizes the four papers in the special issues on ‘Gas and LNG pricing and trading hub in East Asia’. The papers examine
lessons and experience from European hub development, other commodity, the Japanese history on developing of futures markets and inter-fuel
substitution in East Asia. The papers finds that liquid futures market is the key to formulate benchmark prices while a well-developed spot
market is the foundation; political will and strong leadership are required to overcome the power of incumbents and to restructure the gas market
that impede the the development of competitive markets; and East Asia needs to develop its indigenous gas or LNG trading hubs even in low oil
prices period and its developing market allows easier changes in new contracts than in existing ones. This hub development requires govern-
ments to go through tough domestic market reforms, including liberalization and cooperation with each other and with gas exporters.
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Oil indexation has played a positive role in the early stage
development of the natural gas industry. However, as of now,
oil indexation faces many criticisms, which include failure to
reflect gas market fundamentals. In East Asia, LNG and gas
prices are often linked to JCC oil import prices since LNG
was first introduced in Japan as an alternative source of en-
ergy to reduce the high dependence on oil. This oil linkage
guaranteed that gas was competitive with oil. Such an oil
indexation pricing mechanism was used to gain market share
from oil in the early days for gas market development
globally [1]. Although oil indexed gas prices reflected the
market fundamentals of the 1970se1990s in continental
Europe and Asian LNG, fundamentals in both these regions
have changed significantly by the end of the 2000s, but gas* Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney, 123
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mentals [2].
The transition to hub-based pricing has been well advanced
in northwest Europe and North America but has just emerged
in East Asia. North American gas prices reflect gas supply-
demand balances through gas-on-gas competition while Eu-
ropean prices are linked both to oil prices and hub prices. Most
LNG exports to East Asia, including some spot trades, are
however still oil indexed [3]. The share of oil indexed imports
(including both LNG and pipeline gas) in East Asia was 83.7%
of the total imports, against the global average of 48.7% in
2015; 59% of consumption in Asia was oil indexed while gas-
on-gas competitive pricing only accounted for 14%, mainly in
India [4].
In recent years, there were substantial gaps in prices be-
tween the major hub based spot prices in North America and
Europe, and oil indexed long-term contract prices in East Asia
due to high oil prices [5]. In response, in East Asia, the world's
primary destination for LNG, pricing LNG using an oil index
kept LNG prices high and thus drove consumers to use more
reasonably priced coal.Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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long-term contracts to more flexible hub (spot) indexed con-
tracts for its LNG and pipeline gas imports. Since 2010, the
continued prevalence of oil-indexation has had themost adverse
effect on Japan, the world's largest LNG importer. Japan
implemented several strategies to challenge traditional LNG
pricingmechanisms in the region. These included an increase in
the share of spot and short-term purchases, sourcing new sup-
plies from the United States under alternative pricing arrange-
ments and driving regional buyer cooperation [6].
In order to make such a transition successful, a local
benchmark price is needed. This benchmark price will have to
be generated through gas-on-gas competition either within a
major domestic market, such as China or Japan, or between
major markets, such as the East Asian LNG markets. In both
case, establishment of a gas trading hub is required.
The traditional way to create such a trading hub is within a
national market where market liberalization and other
competition policies allow a gas-on-gas competition to reveal
market equilibrium prices. Such a national hub roadmap faces
several challenges in East Asia. First, most East Asian gas
markets, except the Singapore gas market, are not mature, or
are mature but not liberalized and thus are not yet ready to host
such a competitive national trading hub. China and Japan have
unveiled their plan for market liberalization, but the region is
less tolerant to the decade long process of domestic gas market
liberalization.
The regional LNG hub approach is thus proposed as the
alternative, even though a regional LNG trading hub is a novel
idea. This approach creates LNG-on-LNG competition
through removal of restrictions on current LNG trade, mainly
on the destination clauses. Since it does not require national
market liberalization, it can conceivably be achieved quickly.
Given the significance of East Asia in the world's LNG market,
the trade changes in East Asia will have significant impact on
the regional and global LNG markets.
In general, understanding the impact of hub creation, hub
indexation and contract flexibility (hereafter contract changes)
in East Asian gas on regional gas market is a current need of
national policy formulation in East Asia. However, the impact
of such changes is not well understood. More specifically,
since there is no gas trading hub in East Asia, an examination
of ways to create such a hub is an immediate question faced by
policy makers and the industry.
2. The special issue on gas hubs
Given the emerging status of gas trading hubs in East Asia,
and Singapore's efforts to host a trading hub that can offer
benchmark prices for East Asian LNG trade, Energy Studies
Institute (ESI) at the National University of Singapore set up
projects to study key issues on gas/LNG trading hub and
associated market development in East Asia. Key research
issues studied include: (1) history of gas market development
in East Asia and prospects; (2) lessons for establishment of gas
hubs from other commodity markets and gas hubs in Europe
and (3) the roles governments play in the development of thesebenchmark prices around the world. Dedicated studies were
conducted for hubs in commodities such as coal, oil, and iron
ore, for the European hub creation experience and for coal-gas
substitution.
In addition to these projects, two international workshops
were held to facilitate dialogue among multiple stakeholders,
including buyers, sellers and traders, academia, industry and
government officers. The key takeaways from the ensuing
discussions were included in the research report.
In this special issue, we present four research papers from
the ESI research projects and the related workshops. The first
paper is about the European hub development experience
(hereafter the European hub paper). This case study was
conducted mainly for two reasons: first, the European gas
market is in the process of transition and thus drawing on the
experience is relevant; and second, due to its developing sta-
tus, there are always new issues that have not been studied and
thus the additional study can create value added to the liter-
ature. This paper offers a comprehensive analytical framework
that enables hub development and draw implication for East
Asia.
The second paper analyses development of hub based
pricing in three widely traded and most important commod-
ities, namely crude oil, iron ore and coal, to determine key
components and the role of governance in the formation of
market accepted hub based prices (hereafter the commodity
paper). The choice of the three key commodities is based on
their importance and different stages of development in
market based pricing. While East Asia is new to gas trading
hub, it has experienced stages of market formation in these
three commodities. For example, Singapore is a global
trading hub for oil and iron ore. Indonesia has an unsuc-
cessful experience in providing benchmark price for coal, in
spite of its status as the world's largest thermal coal exporter.
The iron ore market is of particular interest because the
market completed transition from long-term contract trade to
spot indexed trade only a decade ago and the development of
Singapore as a trading hub despite having no indigenous
supply and demand.
The third paper studies the experience of the Dojima Rice
Exchange (DRE) (hereafter the DRE paper). The experience
of the DRE, the world's first futures markets, is a useful
reference for East Asia in terms of developing gas futures
markets: it is located in the same region, has had similar
challenges of product standardization, and represents a typical
case that better illustrates the development of commodity
markets from scratch. In various stages of its existence, the
DRE managed to overcome a range of market problems, and
was able to make commodity futures trading efficient. In other
stages, it failed to cope with the challenges, which led to
significant discrepancies between futures and spot prices, and
increased vulnerability faced by market participants. The shift
of economic power from Osaka to Tokyo significantly weak-
ened the DRE but its closure was caused by government de-
cision. Due to the uniqueness of East Asian history, traditions
and culture, the DRE case may offer some lessons for modern
East Asia.
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East Asia (here after the substitution paper). Future develop-
ment of natural gas market in Asia is of much concern. Since
the top three LNG importers in the world: Japan, South Korea
and China take up 55.5% of the world's total traded LNG in
2015, the potential of substitution between natural gas and
other energy sources in some countries may have great regional
and global impact. These different outlooks will also affect the
hub initiative and associated contract changes in the long run.
3. Summary of findings3.1. The European hub paperFindings from the European experience suggest that market
liberalization and transition of gas pricing mechanism are
required to establish such competitive markets while political
will, appropriate regulations and good governance are neces-
sary to safeguard the competition environment.
Market liberalization is a necessary measure to create the
demand for wholesale trade, which in turn is the key incentive
and fundamental role of a trading hub. The transition to hub
pricing and consequently increased flexibility in the long term
gas contracts will create demand for hub trading and increase
liquidity of the price benchmark.
The European hub paper shows that strong political will is
needed to fight with the power of those incumbents that will
suffer from the liberalization process. The creation of hub
indexation poses significant challenges to incumbents, who
might be against the liberalization. Therefore, legislation was
used in Europe to force incumbents to release infrastructure
capacity and gas market shares to new entrants and thus to
increase market competitiveness. For example, the delegali-
zation of “destination clause” provides the legal foundation for
importers to request destination free and the opening-up of
Germany's end-user market through legal decisions kicked off
the change in attitude towards traded gas markets.
Natural factors, such as presence of domestic production
and culture, might have contributed to the hub development
and facilitated gas pricing transition.
As the experience of gas hubs located across continental
Europe demonstrates, they contribute to flourishing trade, but
are preconditioned by the comprehensive process of gas market
liberalization, and no single best model of gas hub development
exists. Nevertheless, transparency and connectivity are neces-
sary features of a benchmark trading hub that is accepted by
market players. The successful development of a liquid
wholesale gas market requires the following efforts: clear rules
and mechanisms that address the choice of a transmission sys-
tem model, the design of the balancing rules, and presence of
transparency requirements. When there are multiple candidates
for benchmark hub, the first mover will have advantage, as the
case of TTF hub prices in the Netherlands.
It also suggests that regulation of financial market players is
important for the sustainable development of gas hubs as
financial players, although necessary to develop futures mar-
ket, may distort the gas markets.3.2. The commodity paperThe commodity paper concludes that the role of gover-
nance is important but vary in the process of transition to
market based pricing. It finds that large volumes of physical
trade often underscore the price creation at trading ports. Since
prices from many physical trade cannot be observed, price
reporting agencies (PRAs) is important in impartial and effi-
cient price and trade information dissemination.
Financial market that appears after the spot market improve
the robustness of pricing mechanisms through the injection of
forward looking price signals from the financial layers. In
these financial markets, although benchmark prices may still
be location-bound to key demand or supply centres (by
specifying specific delivery locations), the corresponding price
become an international price.
The commodity paper suggests different roles of govern-
ment at different stages of hub development. At the initial
stage, governance could play an important role in building
relevant soft and physical infrastructure that will reap the first
mover advantage in hub building. First mover advantage is
crucial in establishing benchmark prices, but will need
continuous reinvention to be continuously relevant. However,
when market develops, government will be less required amid
of concern of distorting markets. In the stabilized market,
governances should maintain stable rules and regulation and
monitor for future changes.3.3. Dojima Rice Exchange paperThe DRE paper proposes a general design of a LNG futures
exchange which offers commodity standardization based on
the terms of the futures contract via either physical or cash
settlement and analyzes the experience of DRE as the first
futures market for commodities in Asia. It argues that the
Asian LNG trading hub needs a bottom-up approach that is
different from existing North American and European ones to
designing its futures exchange due to the lack of a regional
infrastructure connectivity and dominance of LNG trade.
The DRE papers concludes that a well-functioning futures
market can meet a wide range of expectations from the market
participants by facilitating communication, transportation,
financing, storage, price formation, and uncertainty bearing;
financial players such as hedgers and speculators are equally
important to the exchange itself. The diverse interests of
market players are balanced by the contracts with standardized
products. While the participation of financial institutions is
necessary, it has to be properly regulated.
The DRE case study provides a number of implications for
the LNG futures market development. These include market
fundamentals, the division of role between the market and the
government, financial institutions, commodity standardization,
government predictability, and the ability to regulate the
volatility of spot and futures trading.
The experience of the DRE demonstrates that market fun-
damentals, regulations, macroeconomic context, geopolitical
events, and natural factors like weather conditions all affect
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fundamentals are the essential factor for the establishment of a
successful spot market, which is essential for the development
of a futures market. Regulations, although useful, could not
create markets without the market fundamentals. There is a
division of roles between government and the exchange: while
a mature legal and financial system is required for a thriving
future markets, the self-regulation of market is also important.
However, the government can easily shut down even a mature
market through anti-market measures.3.4. The substitution paperIn the substitution paper, a log linear trans-log production
function model is established to investigate inter-fuel elas-
ticity of substitution between coal, oil, natural gas and
electricity in China, Japan and South Korea. The results show
that elasticity estimates of both coal-gas substitution and
coal-electricity substitution to be positive over 1985e2012,
suggesting that these two energy inputs are substitutes at least
to some extent. It also reveals that relatively higher substi-
tution possibilities between coal and natural gas, and less
opportunities to substitute coal with other fuels in China.
Furthermore, the model results suggest the elasticities of
coal-gas substitution in China are much larger than that in
Japan and South Korea, indicating there is higher possibilities
of coal-gas substitution in China.
One point that has not been stated, but implied in the
substitution paper, is that a lower price of natural gas will
stimulate gas consumption through substitution and thus is of
gas sellers' long term interest. The larger elasticities of coal-
gas substitution in China than that in Japan and South Korea
and the outlook for growing energy demand in China indicates
that China is the key determining factor for gas sector devel-
opment in East Asia. Therefore, much of the new pricing
mechanisms and contract terms could be tested from the new
demand from China.
4. Policy implications
All the four papers offer policy implication for East Asia
regarding development of gas hubs and its associated pricing
transition. These can be summarized as market development,
the role of government and lessons for East Asia.4.1. Market developmentA liquid futures market is the key to formulate benchmark
prices while a well-developed spot market is the foundation of
a successful futures market. Market fundamentals are essential
for the development of successful spot and associated futures
markets. Competitive markets are necessary for functional gas
hubs and a highly liquid hub is the one that is widely accepted
by the market.
Financial market players, may cause market turbulence,
and but is a necessary part of the hub development. Spot
trading is necessary but not sufficient for a benchmark hub andthe liquidity in the futures is the key factor of success for a
benchmark hub. However, “commoditization” of LNG global
trade, a consequence of hub development in the long run, will
lead to commodity cycles that are common in commodities
markets.
Since market fundamentals are more or less naturally
determined, the government can advance the hub creation by
creating competitive markets through liberalization and reg-
ulations. Yet, policy makers have to anticipate and prepare
for the volatility of spot and futures trading when making
decision to replacing oil indexation with hub indexation.
Government should enforce appropriate regulation to prevent
financial players from manipulating the market to their
advantage.4.2. Roles of governmentPolitical will and strong leadership are needed to overcome
the power of incumbents and to restructure the gas market.
Government through its legislation and regulations, plays a
critical role in development of gas hubs. Government roles
include safeguarding the competition environment, maintain-
ing law and order and creating the gas market liquidity.
Despite the necessity of government policy, the government
is not the creator of hub as markets are not created by policy or
regulation, but are created by trade and traders. The bound-
aries between policy intervention and markets' own rules have
to be properly defined and the government regulation should
be predictable. Therefore, government roles are needed but
should be selective. Nevertheless, as shown in the case of
DRE, the government can also shut down a mature market
through anti-market measures.
The role of government policy is different at different
stages of market development. While government policy is
critical at the initial stages, as the market develops, market
prefers public policy to adopt a “hands-off” approach. How-
ever, continuing efforts at removing potential market distor-
tions is desirable across the various stages of market
development.4.3. Lessons to for East AsiaEast Asia needs to develop its indigenous gas or LNG
trading hubs. Since the intra-regional pipeline connection is
largely non-existent in East Asia, it is the LNG spot cargo
trading that is likely to become the basis for the regional gas
futures market in the near future.
Although the pathway to such gas trading hubs might be
more difficult than others due to factors such as a lack of
indigenous production and inter-connectivity, vertically inte-
grated industry structure, the traditional preference of supply
security, and unclear political signals, a growing market cre-
ates an opportunity to start new terms with new contracts
without being influenced by vested interests.
To create functional hubs and transition to hub indexation,
East Asian governments need to liberalize gas and electricity
markets, transit to from oil indexation to hub indexation,
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flexibility in LNG markets, and integrate gas and LNG mar-
kets. Separation of transportation from commercial activities,
implementation of Third Party Access to pipeline and LNG
terminals, and liberalization of gas prices are priority areas.
Regional cooperation among consumers and between con-
sumers and producers should be enhanced. Despite the dy-
namics and challenges, collaborative efforts between exporters
and importers to change the pricing mechanisms are necessary
and possible as gas trading hubs could be beneficial for gas
importers and gas exporters by providing the right price signal
that will improve the efficiency of gas utilization. Regional gas
market integration would also be useful to increase the total
liquidity in the LNG and gas market. If the market is efficient,
the East Asian prices will reflect the region's own fundamen-
tals and is fair to both buyers and sellers. As an immediate
solution, suppliers and consumers can cooperate to eliminatedestination restrictions on LNG trade as a freer trade of LNG
will contribute to formation of regional LNG market prices
before gas-on-gas hubs emerges.
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